An assessment of the possibility and desirability of revolution as a strategy for the Malaysian Left.
Jeremy Lim
The revolutionary route is one that has been considered by most socialists to the left of social democracy. The revolutions of 1848, the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution and socialists revolutions in the Global South continues to fuel the imagination of many activists and political parties, more so those of us who were not alive to witness or experience these oft-mythologized events. Given these are well-studied historical conjunctures, it is pertinent to ask if revolution is possible or even desirable.
When discussing the forcible overthrow of the state, making distinctions are important to locate the specific conditions for its success and failure. Armed insurrection and non-violent seizures of power would serve as the two broad categories for framing the discussion of this essay. This generalisation will not map neatly onto world events, past or present – for instance, the Russian Revolution could be considered a largely bloodless affair if you choose to exclude the armed action in Moscow and Ukraine or the ensuing civil war. Nonetheless, it does capture the essence of the debate among socialists of all hues.
Before addressing its possibility in Malaysia in the near future, it would be worth elaborating on the global and regional conditions for revolution. The rapid development of military technology in the 20th and 21st century has radically altered the capacity for small arms struggle to prevail outside an army defection scenario. The immense firepower of modern states makes seizure of power through mass insurrection nearly impossible in both jungle and urban settings. Even in the case of a sustained insurrection or civil war, the intervention of foreign powers – interested in capitalising on or stabilizing the situation – would be difficult to stave off and they would typically take the side of reactionary forces.
Given these developments and if the circumstances permit, non-violent mass action seems to be a more conscionable choice to minimize bloodshed. The success of this strategy in establishing a stable project is highly contingent on the Left’s level of organisation and reach. The near-universal weakness of the socialist parties and trade unions in the face of global capital’s onslaught would mean that mass protests or strikes often occur spontaneously rather than being premeditated by Left forces. In the absence of an organized Left, upheavals in reaction to the failures of the state favour the better-funded array of right-wing forces, resulting in either a modified restoration of the old order or stabilization by the ordained stewards of Capital.
Malaysia’s own experience of armed insurrection occurred in the aftermath of World War 2 when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) took up arms and began a guerilla war of sorts. Though it had not started under the most ideal of circumstances, this choice of strategy had many flaws. The lack of a Malay base of support – noting the MCP’s attacks on Malay collaborators with the Japanese occupation forces – was a major contributor to its failure. Unlike the communist parties of Italy and Yugoslavia who fought the Nazis, the MCP was not able to translate its anti-Japanese credentials into mass support. Even within the urban non-Malay base, its capacity to project leadership was limited given the many other Left forces that better represented the working class. Ultimately, a failure to measure its support amongst Malayans was what led to the poor choice of strategy.
The prospects for both armed and non-violent revolution in Malaysia today seem bleak. The inadequacy of small arms struggle and the present lack of sympathies from the masses for such an action would immediately close off the avenue for armed insurrection. As for non-violent seizure of power, the conditions for such mass action do not currently exist. Despite the corruption and mismanagement by the Malaysian state, political elites have been careful to avoid revolution-inducing mass hunger and privation. In the absence of strong Left and labour forces to highlight the less fatal failures of the state, the anger of the working class and peasants cannot be channelled towards issues aside from widespread poverty or egregious blunders.
Even if we were to picture a scenario where the state did collapse in some fashion, once again, the absence of an organized Left will leave the vacuum to be filled by the most organised forces in Malaysian society. It would not be difficult to see the ethnoreligious Right, long nurtured by the state, or a coalition of parliamentary parties untainted by the aforementioned failures, quickly occupying the vacuum of power. Global hegemons like the US and China would not be uninterested in the outcome given the possible domino effect politically and the economic ramifications on its vast Malaysian investments.
Returning to the original question then, is a revolution in Malaysia possible or desirable in the near future? The recent Arab Spring experience would be instructive on both questions. The skyrocketing of bread prices in the Middle East is a phenomenon largely absent in Malaysian history in which the state has actively intervened to stabilise the price of staples. Barring the state imposing a punitive tax on the masses or the mishandling of a crisis, the possibility of mass upheaval leading to revolt is slim to none. The desirability of revolution, given the circumstances, is therefore much less so in the short- and medium-term. If an infant socialist movement pushes for mass action without a proper accounting of its forces, the aftermath of its suppression by the state can only advantage the forces of the Right. Though some might think of such events as dress rehearsals for revolutions to come – à la the 1905 Russian Revolution leading to the events of 1917 – the uncertainty of the outcome should give any would-be revolutionary pause in acting so hastily.
Info: The article was originally published here.