The electoral victory of the ex-general-turned-cuddly-populist Prabowo Subianto on 20 March marks the continuation of illiberal democracy in Indonesia. However, the moral panic that followed the announcement of his presidency may be exaggerated, writes Iqra Anugrah, who argues for a more nuanced analysis of Indonesia’s current and future political trajectory. The dangers for democracy posed by Prabowo’s impending rule is just a symptom of the larger problem of oligarchic rule in the Global South.
by Iqra Anugrah
Indonesian democracy is at a crossroads. Prabowo Subianto, a retired general who served in the army during the dictatorship of his former father-in-law, Suharto, and who has a tainted reputation due to his alleged involvement in human rights abuses, is set to become the next president of Indonesia. Despite claims of possible electoral irregularities and attempts by losing presidential candidates Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo to challenge the election results at the Constitutional Court, the official results have shown that Prabowo has won the presidential race.
For Indonesian social movements, his electoral victory is bad news. There is growing concern among activists that Prabowo’s presidency will roll back hard-won democratic achievements, including freedoms of speech, association, and the press. But this sentiment, while understandable, overstates Prabowo’s agency and overlooks the fact that it was during the two-term tenure of incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) that Indonesian democracy became increasingly oligarchic and illiberal. After years of subscribing to authoritarian populism — a worrying trend that is observed globally — it was only a matter of time before Indonesia was to have its own version of Rodrigo Duterte or Bongbong Marcos.
Responding to the election of Prabowo, political sociologist Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir recently argued that democracy in Indonesia “will keep on running just as it did before”. While acknowledging the real possibility of a deeper illiberal turn under Prabowo’s presidency, he challenged the alarmist tone in social movement and media circles and the claim that Indonesia would fall back into a full-blown autocracy under Prabowo’s rule. He argued that elites have benefitted politically and economically from electoral democracy since 1998. The current regime will therefore likely remain in place.
Mudhoffir’s assessment offers a more sober view of possible scenarios under Prabowo’s rule. However, his argument that struggles for and the sharing of power among elites is the main driver of the stability of illiberal democracy is too one-dimensional. I do agree that, rather than a return to dictatorship, Indonesia could witness the continuation of the illiberal democracy developed under Jokowi’s rule.
But in my view, a more nuanced analysis of the implications of Prabowo’s ascension to the presidency is necessary — one that would require us to look at three factors: 1) the nature of electoral competition among political elites, 2) the relations between democracy and oligarchic capitalism in Indonesia, and 3) the political aspirations of Indonesian voters. By looking at these three factors, we can better describe the overall characteristics of Indonesian democracy under Prabowo’s presidency and help concerned activists, social movements, and citizens to formulate their next steps.
Political elites remain powerful, but are kept in check
Indonesian politicians across parties and levels of government have benefitted from free and open electoral competition since 1999. Established elites quickly adapted to the new electoral game that arose as the country transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy, and newer players such as local businesspeople have gained significant influence. At the national level, elites are able to easily share post-election “spoils” among themselves, which include a portion of the state budget and ministerial appointments. At the local level, district heads can win elections through acts of patronage or shady deals with extractive businesses, such as mining corporations. Obviously, these acts of elites demonstrate their preference for a more authoritarian arrangement marked by less popular participation, dissenting opinions, and redistributive demands, but their ambition is tempered by the structural and institutional constraints of the Indonesian state, such as the lack of a direct monopoly of economic resources and state institutions by local elites.
Oligarchic capitalism and democracy: friends, not foes
Secondly, as has been pointed out by political economists and critical scholars, democracy and oligarchic capitalism can coexist in Indonesia. Indonesia’s elitist form of democracy poses no significant threat to the interests of the capitalist class. This can be seen in how businesses and investors welcomed the general elections as a mechanism for ensuring political stability and a peaceful transfer of power needed for economic growth and investment. In fact, in the absence of solid social democratic demands for wealth redistribution, expansive social welfare programmes, and working-class control over the economy and political processes, the business community should be quite happy to adjust its operations in a formally democratic environment.
It is small wonder that a long time ago political scientist Benedict Anderson had warned that elections in Southeast Asia including in Indonesia are indicative of “bourgeois political dominance.” Put cynically, it is in the interests of the elites themselves to maintain an illiberal form of democracy with robust electoral dimensions.
Indonesian voters want a disciplined democracy
Lastly, one must not forget the political aspirations of Indonesian voters themselves. Prabowo won the election by a wide margin and enjoyed the support of the Gen Z voters. And the fact that Prabowo’s candidacy was supported by Jokowi, who remains popular among the Indonesian public, helps to enhance his image as a faithful successor of Jokowi’s brand of developmentalism.
One might balk at this political preference, but despite concerns from activists and scholars, most Indonesian voters see this as a genuine exercise of their democratic rights. A recent survey shows that close to 71% of respondents think that the quality of Indonesian democracy is either “good” or “very good.” This phenomenon of societal illiberalism is not exclusive to Indonesia. In the neighboring Philippines, especially upper- and middle-class voters have been embracing a quasi-authoritarian, exclusionary conception of democracy in response to the perceived “messiness” of liberal democratic procedures.
A contextual assessment is needed
This is not to minimize the potential dangers of Prabowo’s presidency, but it is important to contextually assess such dangers beyond moral panic. An alarmist take on the rise of an authoritarian-leaning president is a sign of knee-jerk liberalism, which is detached from the material concerns of the working people and steers us away from the important task of rejuvenating democratic class politics.
Most likely, democratic “stability” under Prabowo’s presidency will be a perverse one. Free electoralism will remain the only game in town, but episodic repressions of democratic rights and the contraction of democratic spaces will continue, especially in semi-urban and rural areas. Oligarchic control of politics and economy too will continue.
The increasing fragmentation of Indonesian social movements, partly due to their disagreement in engaging Jokowi’s government, makes resisting authoritarian tendencies in the upcoming Prabowo administration an arduous task. But hope should not be lost. Despite the rise of conservative politics, a new cohort of student and social movement activists has emerged and for the first time in recent years a new Labor Party, which was formed by leading labor unions, managed to join the general elections this year.
Prabowo’s presidency will not lead to a return of a Cold War-style capitalist dictatorship. Nevertheless, it will herald a new dawn in the contemporary history of Indonesian democracy, where illiberal tendencies become the norms rather than exceptions.
About the author: Iqra Anugrah is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden University and a Research Associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). He has conducted extensive fieldwork-based research on democracy, development, social movements, and local politics in Indonesia.
Originally published in Bliss on 9 April 2024.